Good morning Africa Briefers,

This week, we take a closer look at last week’s catastrophic flooding in Libya, which has killed thousands in and around the eastern city of Derna. We’ll give you a recap of what has taken place and reflect on how this happened, looking in particular at both the environmental and political causes of the disaster, before reflecting on the implications of the flood both domestically and internationally.

On the night of the 10th of September, Storm Daniel made landfall on Libya’s Mediterranean coastline. Having previously swept through Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (The Guardian), the storm collided with the city of Derna in eastern Libya, where it destroyed two dams, leading enormous amounts of water to surge through the city centre. Healthcare and government officials in the eastern Libyan government have told the press that entire districts of the city have been completely destroyed and Derna’s single hospital had been overwhelmed with casualties (FT). Humanitarian relief efforts have also been substantially hampered by the lasting damage from the floods, with many roads either washed away completely or still underwater (FT). Current estimates of the death toll vary, but some fear the toll could exceed 20,000 people (Al Jazeera; BBC).

The scale of the damage and destruction has led many to question why the flooding happened on the scale that it did. Reasons for this are manifold, encompassing both environmental and political factors.

Climate change plays a significant role in creating the meteorological conditions that escalate the likelihood of major flooding globally. Indeed, Libya joins numerous other countries, including Japan, the US, and Brazil that have also experienced deadly floods so far this month (FloodList). In the buildup to Storm Daniel, Mediterranean water temperatures climbed above 27.5C, 2-3 degrees higher than is normal for the region at this time of year, raising the likelihood of powerful storms (FT; Sky). Some climate scientists have already claimed that anthropogenic climate change was likely a major - though not the only - factor in determining the intensity of Storm Daniel (BBC; FT). Current climate modelling projects that similar such Mediterranean storms will actually decrease in frequency with the advance of climate change, but those that do take place will be much more powerful. Some commentators have made the important observation here that the most vulnerable people to these increases in storm intensity are also those least responsible for climate change (Sky) - in 2022, Libya was responsible for just 0.19% of global greenhouse gas emissions emissions (54th in the world; EDGAR - European Commission), with its historic relative contributions to emissions even less.

Nonetheless, while many acknowledge the important role of climate change in increasing the severity of the storm and thus the collapse of the dams, political factors also played an important role. First though, a brief recap of recent political developments in Libya.

Since the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in 2011, supported by a NATO-led coalition, Libya has been engulfed in political turmoil, with various actors fighting for control. From the fray, two main forces have emerged: the UN-backed government in the capital of Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and backed to varying extents by Italy, Qatar, and Turkey, and the so-called ‘House of Representatives’ government based in Tobruk and de facto led by General Khalifa Haftar, one of those who instigated the coup against Gaddafi more than a decade ago, and who has led his ‘Libyan National Army’ (LNA) in battles against various political factions since Gaddafi’s demise. He has been supported by France, Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. One of the most significant fights in which Haftar has been engaged is against Islamist militants backed by Islamic State and al-Qaeda. While these groups persist in Libya, Haftar took their last stronghold in eastern Libya, the now-flooded city of Derna, in 2018 (see Council for Foreign Relations for a more detailed summary).

Currently, Haftar’s forces hold the majority of eastern and central Libya, with only Dbeibah’s regime in Tripoli and remnants of other forces in the country’s interior challenging Haftar’s supremacy. Thus while foreign governments are aware of the corruption and brutal war crimes that have been alleged of Haftar’s administration, some have supported him as a means of promoting stability in the country - largely due to his being seen to be the only force in Libya with the might to stem migration to Europe, fight Islamist militant insurgencies, and secure oil exports (NYT).

While various ceasefires have been negotiated between the two sides of the conflict, a transition towards elections, national unity, and democracy remains elusive in the country, with elections due to take place in 2021 cancelled due to complex debates surrounding what the elections would look like and who could stand (see this Foreign Policy article for a more detailed explanation).

In the immediate aftermath of last week’s floods, many apportioned blame to the eastern Libyan government, noting that warnings from experts about the vulnerabilities of the dams and from meteorologists about the strength of the storm were not listened to (FT; Al Jazeera; BBC). The dams were both built in the 1970s to protect the city from floods, from which it was previously vulnerable, but no maintenance had taken place in recent years, despite the allocation of US$2 million for that purpose in 2012/2013 (Al Jazeera; The Guardian). Furthermore, international experts raised the alarm about the possibility of flooding within the 48 hours prior to the dams being breached, but seemingly little effective action was taken, though there are conflicting reports about whether citizens were instructed to stay in or leave their homes in the wake of the storm (BBC). More broadly, others have pointed to the corruption and failure of government institutions, and to the neglect of Derna in particular, to which little effort has been paid since it was taken by Haftar’s forces 5 years ago (FT)

Those in government in Tobruk have rebuked such perspectives, arguing that the collapse of the dams was completely unexpected and insisting that the event was a natural, rather than a political, disaster (FT). Others have pointed out that Derna was neglected long before the stretched current government existed; considered to be a hub of anti-Gaddafi activism for decades during his regime, Derna was systematically and continuously underfunded (BBC). These views are not shared by all however: protesters in Derna recently burnt down the house of the (now former-) Mayor of the city, who has now been replaced by an ally of General Haftar, and many are calling for an immediate investigation into what happened, blaming the government for failing to alert the public of the risk of the dams’ collapse (BBC; NYT). Commentators and protestors alike are also pointing to the profound corruption of Haftar’s administration, saying that the country’s oil revenues are lining the pockets of Haftar and his allies and that they are responsible for the lack of effective governance institutions and almost non-existent infrastructural investment in eastern Libya (NYT).

The fallout from the floods is ongoing, and humanitarian workers are presently focussed on reducing the possibility of further crises for those afflicted, such as major contamination of drinking water (ABC). Nonetheless, so far, it seems that the disaster has rallied different actors in the conflict together, both in Libya and internationally.

For instance, the FT reports that Turkey, which has supported Dbeibah’s Tripoli-based government, has dispatched cargo planes packed with 168 search and rescue specialists as well as various emergency aid provisions to Benghazi for use in relief operations, while Egypt, which has supported the eastern Libyan administration, has sent helicopters and soldiers. The US, Italy, and other Western states meanwhile, which with the exception of France support Dbeibah, have sent financial aid (FT). Given that international division both amongst Western and also Middle Eastern states has been a major contributing factor for the continuation of Libya’s conflict and political instability (USIP; ECFR), with actors seeking to influence the outcomes in their own interests, it is potentially promising that more cooperation is taking place internationally.

Within Libya meanwhile, there has been enormous support for relief efforts, even as there are anti-government protests. The FT reports that there has been “an outpouring of support from other parts of the country, despite the political divides. On the road to Derna trucks loaded with mattresses, bottled water and other supplies could be seen, often with the name of the town or village offering the aid. Many vehicles bore the slogan ‘brothers to the rescue’”.

Yet it remains to be seen for how long these coalitions of support can be sustained, and whether the flood will serve as a catalyst that reignites negotiations that might bring to an end years of turmoil.

It is clear at this point that much of the destruction wrought by Storm Daniel could have been prevented were Derna and the eastern Libyan government to have had more established and effective governmental institutions - especially one tasked with monitoring meteorological hazards. It is also clear that the dams that collapsed were in dire need of repair, and questions might rightly be asked about where Libya’s vast oil revenues, much of which are controlled by Haftar’s forces, are going, and why seemingly nothing was done to fix them despite warnings from experts. That one could make an almost identical argument about the breaking of the levees when Hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the US in 2005 is perhaps by-the-by.

This notwithstanding, climate change has likely played a central role in the destruction wrought by the storm. Extreme weather events such as that which hit Libya last week, as well as other environmental shocks exacerbated by climate change, are becoming ever-more frequent in Africa. According to the State of the Climate in Africa 2022 report, the continent suffered more than $8.3bn in economic damages due to climate change last year, while more than 110m people on the continent were directly affected by weather, climate and water-related hazards (News24). This is only set to rise in coming years. In contexts in which infrastructure is weak and/or neglected, due to financial constraints, civil war, or political neglect, climate change will compound and worsen existing vulnerabilities with profound economic, political, and social ramifications. That Africa is the continent least responsible for climate change but the most vulnerable to its effects is already well established (AfDB; UN; WMO).

However, the ongoing conflict and political crisis in the country is also an important factor in explaining what went wrong, and it is a critical barrier to the establishment of a government that is better able to look after its people. It is possible that this catastrophe will inspire the advancement of negotiations between the respective sides of the deadlock, as well as their international backers and such an outcome should be supported.

That said, it is equally possible that the flood will enable Haftar to strengthen his power. Even as some blame his administration for what happened, Haftar has appointed his son as the director of the relief operation, deployed the military to Derna, banned foreign journalists from the scene (who were apparently getting in the way), and - according to some reports - cut telephone and internet services to the city (The Guardian), while his eldest son has chosen this moment to declare his intentions to run for President (The Conversation). Amidst growing concern about flows of migration from Africa to Europe (which Haftar’s forces may have previously played a role in facilitating; NYT), foreign powers could come together and agree that a Haftar-led regime - with all its flaws - provides stability and certainty, and thus that it’s better than the alternative.

That’s all from us this week! If you would like to donate to humanitarian aid operations in Derna, you can do so here.